

CHAPTER IV

CLOSING

A. Conclusion

Based on the first research question, concerning the comparison of investigative authority between Indonesia and Hong Kong, this study concludes that the most significant difference lies not in the scope of formal powers but in institutional independence and operational autonomy. In Hong Kong, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) operates with a high degree of autonomy, reporting directly to the Chief Executive and insulated from external interference. This independence enables the ICAC to implement its three-pronged strategy investigation, prevention, and education efficiently and consistently. In contrast, Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), although formally endowed with broad investigative and prosecutorial powers, faces serious constraints due to its subordination to the executive branch and the requirement of supervisory board approval for key investigative actions. These structural limitations have significantly reduced the effectiveness of its formal mandate.

Based on the second research question, regarding the strengths and weaknesses of each system, the study finds that Hong Kong's model derives its strength from the ICAC's centralized authority, professional independence, and strong public trust, which together have produced consistently high international rankings in corruption perception indices. Its main challenge lies in navigating political pressures, although robust institutional safeguards have

largely mitigated this risk. Conversely, Indonesia's pluralistic system, involving the KPK, Police, and Attorney General's Office, was designed to be comprehensive but has instead fostered overlapping jurisdictions, institutional rivalry, and inefficiency. The KPK's greatest weakness is its vulnerability to political influence and bureaucratic hurdles, which have hampered its ability to act decisively, particularly against high-level corruption.

Ultimately, the comparison underscores a critical insight: an institution with narrower formal powers but full independence, such as the ICAC, can be far more effective than an institution with broad powers but compromised autonomy, such as the KPK. The key lesson for Indonesia is that genuine reform must prioritize restoring the KPK's independence, clarifying and streamlining investigative authority to prevent overlap, and insulating the institution from political interference. Only through these measures can Indonesia establish a more effective anti-corruption framework capable of achieving results comparable to Hong Kong's experience.

B. Recommendations

This study proposes two key recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of Indonesia's anti-corruption framework.

1. It is essential to legally restore the full independence and operational autonomy of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). The comparative analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness of Hong Kong's ICAC largely stems from its institutional independence, which shields it

from political and bureaucratic interference. By contrast, Indonesia's main vulnerability lies in the 2019 legal reform that placed the KPK under the executive branch and introduced a Supervisory Board with veto power over its most critical investigative tools. To address this, Law No. 19 of 2019 should be amended to re-establish the KPK as an independent state institution accountable directly to parliament or, ideally, the public, rather than the president. Furthermore, the Supervisory Board's authority should be limited strictly to internal ethics and administrative matters, with no role in authorizing investigative measures such as wiretapping, searches, or arrests. Restoring such autonomy is a necessary precondition for the KPK to effectively investigate high-level corruption and resist political pressure.

2. it is vital to rationalize and clarify investigative authority to eliminate the current pluralism and overlapping jurisdiction among the KPK, the Police, and the Attorney General's Office. The comparative findings reveal that overlapping jurisdictions in Indonesia generate legal uncertainty, inter-agency conflict, and inefficiency, exemplified by disputes such as the Pinangki case and the driving license simulator scandal. To resolve this, the law should explicitly designate the KPK as the lead agency for major corruption cases involving state officials or law enforcement officers, particularly where financial losses exceed a defined threshold. The Police and Attorney General's Office should be limited to handling minor corruption cases below this threshold, with any qualifying cases transferred immediately to the KPK. Moreover, the KPK should retain

supervisory authority to ensure consistency and accountability across all agencies. Establishing a unified digital reporting and case-management system would further enhance transparency, reduce conflict, and streamline investigative responsibilities. Together, these reforms would strengthen Indonesia's anti-corruption framework by restoring the KPK's independence, clarifying the division of authority, and ensuring a coherent and effective institutional design capable of producing outcomes comparable to the ICAC model.